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monetary policy body, implements its monetary
policy by setting a target level for the federal funds
interest rate in the overnight market for bank
reserves. The Fed calls this target the “intended
rate.” Given this mode of operation, the effects
of monetary policy work primarily through mar-
ket expectations of future monetary policy
actions, because those expectations determine
longer-term interest rates that affect economic
decisions by firms and households. Thus, the
accuracy of market forecasts of future policy
actions is at the heart of the transmission of
monetary policy to the economy. Expectations
about future monetary policy, in turn, depend on
expectations about events and new information
that may lead the Fed to alter the intended rate.
Now look at Figure 1, which reports daily
data from the futures market for federal funds.
The futures interest rate shown here is the mar-
ket’s best guess about the average federal funds
rate for June 2000. The figure also shows the level
of the Fed’s target for the federal funds rate. On
May 16, the FOMC raised the intended rate from
6 to 6½ percent. This figure shows the interest
rate from trading in the futures market for the 30
days before and the 30 days after the meeting.
The interesting thing about this figure is the
accuracy of the market’s forecast despite the fact
that a Fed policy action to change the intended
rate by 50 basis points is a rare event. The first
trading day shown on the figure is April 4. On
this day, the intended rate was 6 percent. The
June federal funds futures contract price reflected
a market expectation that the average federal funds
rate in June would be 6¼ percent. When the Fed
changes the intended rate, the change is usually
25 basis points, and that is what the futures market
I
’m going to discuss a topic tonight that
has been a research interest of mine for a
long time. Over the years, I have puzzled
over what to make of market reactions to
news of Federal Reserve policy actions and eco-
nomic data releases that might logically have
implications for Fed actions. Since coming to
the St. Louis Fed in March 1998, my views have
coalesced into a research program, which I am
pursuing with bank colleagues. In fact, given all
I have to do, they do most of the work, as you
might expect. In this lecture, I’ll rely heavily on
a paper I wrote jointly with Robert H. Rasche,
director of research at the St. Louis Fed. The
paper, entitled “Perfecting the Market’s Knowledge
of Monetary Policy,” is available in the working
papers section of the St. Louis Fed web site; it
will be published in the Journal of Financial
Services Research.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I especially thank my St. Louis
Fed colleagues who have provided extensive
assistance in preparing several lectures on various
aspects of the issue at hand. However, I retain
full responsibility for errors.
FORECASTING FED POLICY
DECISIONS
Let’s begin by looking at some recent events
in financial markets. I’ll examine these events by
using several figures, which appear at the end of
the text and in a handout everyone should have.
As I think everyone here knows, the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC), the Fed’s mainwas expecting. The June futures rate was steady
until the last week of April, when it jumped pretty
quickly in a couple of days. Then it continued to
rise during the next few weeks, gradually increas-
ing to 6½ percent. On May 16, the FOMC voted
to raise the intended rate to 6½ percent. Since it
is unlikely that the Fed would raise the target
between the FOMC meetings—the next meeting
was held on June 27 and 28—by May 15 the
market perfectly predicted what the FOMC
would do at its meeting the next day.
What do we make of this situation in which
the market correctly forecasts what the Fed is
going to do? Is the Fed just following the market?
Is the Fed leaking to the market what it intends to
do? Is it a good thing that the market can predict
Fed actions? To answer these questions, it helps
to consider the relationship between the futures
market and Fed policy actions in more detail.
FOUR POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
Figure 1 illustrates the situation in which the
market correctly forecasts a Fed decision to change
the intended rate. In fact, there are four possible
combinations to consider. The Fed might change
the intended rate, or not change it, and in each
case the market might correctly forecast the Fed’s
decision, or not forecast correctly.
Figure 2 contains a matrix of actual examples
for each outcome from the federal funds futures
market. It is possible that the market anticipates
the policy decision or that it does not. The two
figures on the left side of Figure 2 show examples
where the policy decision was correctly antici-
pated. The two on the right show examples where
it was not. Let’s look at these cases a little further.
The upper-left panel of Figure 2 shows trading
in the futures contract for September 1990 and
the FOMC meeting held August 16, 1990. In this
case, the futures market expected a relatively
large (50 basis point) increase in the intended
federal funds rate, and the FOMC raised the rate
50 basis points. This case is like the one examined
in Figure 1.
The upper-right panel of Figure 2 shows
trading in the futures contract for January 1991
and the FOMC meeting held December 18, 1990.
Before the meeting, the markets were not antici-
pating that the FOMC would reduce the intended
rate; the rate for the January futures contract did
not fall until after the FOMC acted. In fact, during
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Figure 1
Fed Funds Futures and the Fed’s Interest Rate Targetthe life of this contract, the FOMC reduced the
federal funds target three times, and each change
appears to have surprised the market.
The two panels in the bottom half of Figure 2
show examples where the FOMC’s decision was
to leave the intended rate unchanged. The bottom-
left panel shows trading in the futures contract for
June 1995 and the FOMC meeting held May 23,
1995. In this case, the markets expected no change
in the federal funds target and the FOMC left the
target unchanged.
Finally, the bottom-right panel of Figure 2
shows trading in the federal funds futures contract
for August 1994 and the FOMC meeting held
July 6, 1994. Before the meeting, the markets were
anticipating a large increase in the target rate, but
the Fed did not change the rate at its July meeting.
However, in this case the futures rate did not
change much after the meeting; the market was
still expecting the Fed to act, which it eventually
did at its meeting of August 16, 1994.
Before going any further, let me mention
briefly a few general findings from my research
on this subject. First, the accuracy of market pre-
dictions of Fed policy improved dramatically in
1994. Second, most of the changes in the federal
funds futures rates are driven by economic news
such as the monthly employment report and the
inflation data. A relatively small part of the
changes in the futures rates comes on days Fed
officials give speeches or testimony. Although
Rasche and I did not investigate the issue of leaks
in our research, I am convinced that leaks are
extremely rare. I know of only one example of a
leaksinceIarrivedattheSt.LouisFed—itreceived
attention in the press in the spring of 1998—and
it only indirectly concerned the probable future
setting of the intended funds rate anyway.
UNDERSTANDING MARKET
SUCCESS IN FORECASTING FED
POLICY ACTIONS
I’m now going to illustrate the key issues
concerning market success, or lack thereof, in
forecasting Fed actions by analyzing more closely
the case discussed in Figure 1. Let’s put aside the
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Figure 2
Four Possible Scenariosrelatively infrequent cases in which speeches or
testimony by Fed officials seem to telegraph Fed
intentions. And I also want to put aside the
hypothesis that the Fed is simply following the
market, because I’m convinced from my own
observation of the process that this hypothesis is
not true.
If the market can predict Fed policy actions
quite consistently, then Fed behavior must be
systematic and regular enough that the market
can make accurate predictions. Thus, the ability
of the market to predict Fed policy actions means
that the market understands the Fed’s objectives
and the Fed and the markets are reading the flow
of incoming information the same way. In this
situation, Fed policy adjustments will not take
markets by surprise.
Now look at Figure 3. This figure provides a
more detailed examination of trading in the June
2000 federal funds futures contract from the initial
trade on January 24, 2000, to maturity on June 30,
2000. The figure also includes the history of the
federal funds target, which stood at 5½ percent
on January 24; the FOMC raised the intended rate
to 5¾ percent at its first meeting of the year on
February 1-2. The FOMC raised the target again,
by another 25 basis points, at its meeting on
March 21. As we already saw in Figure 1, the
final, 50-basis-point increase came on May 16.
The opening price of the contract on January
24 implied a June federal funds rate of 6.14 per-
cent. Private forecasters were expecting some
slowing in the economy. For example, the January
Blue Chip consensus forecast was for 3.0 percent
real GDP growth in 2000:Q1 and 2.9 percent for
the year. The upward trend in inflation that had
occurred in 1999 was expected to continue in
2000. The best way to interpret the June federal
funds futures rate of 6.14 percent on January 24
is that market participants placed a probability a
bit above 0.5 that the Fed would raise the intended
rate by 25 basis points and a probability a bit
below 0.5 that the Fed would leave the intended
rate unchanged.
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Figure 3
June Contract for Fed Funds and Economic NewsFigure 3 includes vertical lines on days when
there were relatively large changes in the interest
rate on the June futures contract. The threshold
I’ve used for defining a “relatively large” change
was ±5 basis points. During the life of this contract,
there were eight days on which the absolute
change was 5 basis points or larger. These days
are sorted into four episodes.
The first episode included a Friday and a
Monday, January 28 and 31. On Friday, January 28,
the federal funds futures rate rose 9 basis points.
On that day, the 1999 fourth quarter GDP data
were released showing that real GDP had grown
5.8 percent at an annual rate, well above market
expectations. The January Blue Chip consensus,
for example, had been 4.5 percent. Inflation also
came in higher than expected—2.0 versus 1.6
percent at an annual rate. On Monday, the stock
markets rose sharply and the federal funds futures
rate rose another 5 basis points as markets digested
the unexpectedly good news about economic
growth and the effect that it was having on fore-
casts for future interest rates. After receiving this
information, the market expected the federal funds
target rate to average 6.25 percent in June.
The second episode included a rise and then
a decline surrounding Fed Chairman Alan
Greenspan’s congressional testimony about mone-
tary policy. The first day of his testimony was on
February 17. That day the federal funds futures
rate for June rose six basis points to 6.27 percent.
The next day, the Wall Street Journal reported,
“Greenspan signaled that the Fed will keep boost-
ing rates unless both consumer spending and the
stock market quickly cool down.”
On February 22, the federal funds futures
rate fell 6 basis points. There were no significant
economic data released, and so we cannot link
that decline to any particular piece of new infor-
mation. On February 24, the federal funds futures
rate fell another 5 basis points after the govern-
ment reported that orders for durable goods fell
1.3 percent in January, suggesting that the econ-
omy might be slowing a bit.
The FOMC did raise the federal funds target
to 6 percent on March 21; from examining the
April federal funds futures contract, we know
that this increase was well anticipated by the
market. As can be seen in Figure 3, at this point
the federal funds futures rate for June was 6.24
percent, indicating that the market expected
another 25 basis point increase at the May FOMC
meeting.
During the third episode, the federal funds
futures rate fell 10 points on April 4 and then
bounced back up 5 points on April 5. It is not
clear what was the cause of the initial decline.
The stock market had been very volatile on
April 4—the Dow Jones industrials fell over 500
points early in the day and then recovered to
finish the day down only 57. On April 5, the Dow
fell another 131 points but Greenspan gave a
speech that left markets believing the Fed would
lift the federal funds target in May. At the end of
this episode, the federal funds futures rate for
June was 6.28.
The final episode occurred on April 27 with
the release of the advance GDP report for the first
quarter. This report showed that real GDP rose at
a 5.4 percent rate in the first quarter, with con-
sumer spending jumping 8.3 percent, which was
the largest quarterly increase in more than 17
years. Labor costs rose 4.3 percent, and consumer
prices continued to rise. It is interesting to note
that the news was exceptional in one way: The
marketwassurprisedbybothhigherthanexpected
real growth and higher than expected inflation.
Since 1994, there had been many upside surprises
about real GDP growth, but they had typically
been accompanied by lower than expected infla-
tion. The Wall Street Journal reported that, “The
inflation news boosts the odds that the Fed will
soon raise interest rates by an aggressive half a
percentage point.” The federal funds futures
market seemed to agree because the rate rose by
11 basis points on that day to close at 6.41. The
rate then rose gradually to 6.49 on the Friday
before the May 16 meeting.
I’ve recounted the story of the June 2000
federal funds futures contract in some detail to
illustrate a general point. How can the market
participants successfully predict what the FOMC
will do at its next meeting? That is, how do they
know the interpretation the FOMC will place on
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recounted in the history of the June futures con-
tract? Part of the answer is that market participants
carefully follow speeches by FOMC members,
especiallythosebytheChairman,AlanGreenspan.
ThetrackrecordofFOMCactionsisalso obviously
important. Understanding how the FOMC has
reacted to information in the past aids in predict-
ing how the Committee will respond to similar
information in the future.
Market participants pull together other types
of information as well. They receive the minutes
of the FOMC meetings with a six or seven-week
delay, a few days after the next scheduled meet-
ing. These minutes reveal the topics discussed,
summarize views about the state of the economy,
and describe the reasons for dissenting votes.
The minutes are thorough, which provides an
important vehicle for keeping the markets and
the public well informed about Fed thinking.
Markets have been able to forecast Fed policy
actions partly because the policy process is becom-
ing more transparent than it was in the past. Since
February 1994, the FOMC has announced changes
in the federal funds target the same day that the
decisions were made. As recently as the late 1980s,
the Federal Reserve was still using a complex
signaling method of conducting open market
operations to inform markets about changes in
the federal funds rate target. This complex method
sometimes took several days to transfer informa-
tion about policy changes. Occasionally, the sig-
nals were crossed and markets perceived changes
when there were none. Not only was the process
inefficient, but also it tended to favor the bond
market dealers who had a special arrangement to
participate in the execution of open market oper-
ations. Announcing target changes the day they
are made makes knowledge about policy changes
immediately known to all.
Another important feature of post-1994 Fed
practice is that almost all policy actions came at
regularly scheduled meetings of the FOMC. Before
1994, the Fed changed the intended rate more
often between regular meetings than at regular
meetings. Clearly, before 1994, the market was
almost always taken by surprise by Fed policy
actions because the timing of the policy decisions
between scheduled FOMC meetings could not
be predicted.
INTERPRETING MARKET
SUCCESS IN FORECASTING FED
POLICY ACTIONS
I’ll now offer several possible interpretations
ofmarketsuccessinforecastingFedpolicyactions.
The first is that the Fed is simply following the
market. I can dispose of this argument on two
levels. First, from my own experience I’m con-
vinced that it is not true. Even recently, the Fed
has sometimes surprised the market. A clear exam-
ple is the fall of 1998, when the bond and stock
markets were upset following the Russian default
in August 1998. By reducing the intended federal
funds rate on October 15, between regularly
scheduled meetings, the FOMC led interest rates
lower. On a theoretical level, the market equilib-
rium is not defined if the central bank simply
follows the market, because the interest rate
depends on the rate of inflation. The inflation
rate is not pinned down at all if the central bank
simply follows the market.
Another possibility is that Fed officials, espe-
cially the chairman, signal the market as to what
the policy decision will be. Rasche and I investi-
gated all daily changes in the one-month ahead
federal funds futures contract from October 1988,
when the market began, through February of this
year. We identified all daily changes of 5 basis
points or more, which we defined as “large”
changes, and examined the news arriving in the
market on those days. Of the 57 large changes, only
6 occurred on days when speeches or testimony
by Fed officials might have been responsible.
Twelve of the large changes occurred in response
to Fed policy actions. On 25 occasions, press
speculation about policy actions was evident;
for 9 of these, the speculation seemed related to
release of employment data.
Let me step back to suggest another approach
to understanding market success in forecasting
Fed policy actions. Consider a formal mathemati-
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we have to specify a policy rule for the central
bank. The equation specifying that rule contains
the policy objective or objectives and a precise
description of how the central bank sets its policy
instruments. The policy rule, presumably, feeds
back from data on realizations of exogenous and
endogenous variables, or forecasts derived from
these variables.
In the United States, the Federal Reserve and
the market receive new data from government
statistical releases at essentially the same time.
Thus, in the mathematical model of the economy,
the only reasonable assumption is that the market
knows the policy rule, having learned it from
experience or some other way, and draws the
same implication for policy actions the central
bank does from the arrival of new information.
To run a model simulation, we could set the
model in motion by imposing stochastic shocks
in the various equations. What we would observe
in a simulation of this model is that the market’s
forecasts of policy actions—forecasts embedded
in the term structure of interest rates—would be
driven by the arrival of new information. Let me
emphasize again that the new information that
affects the market is the exact same information
that controls the policy decisions.
The most reasonable interpretation of the
Poole-Rasche empirical findings, I believe, is that
in the United States today the market acts as if it
pretty closely understands the policy model the
Fed uses. There is a mystery, however. The FOMC
does not follow a well-specified monetary rule
that can be written down as an equation or for-
mula. How is it that the market and the Fed can so
consistently agree on the interpretation of new
information and its significance for policy actions,
or lack thereof? I don’t know the answer to this
question. Finding the answer may be important
for carrying into the future the market’s current
success in forecasting Fed policy actions. If we
can formalize what the Fed does, it should be
possible to further improve transparency and
accuracy of communication with the market in
the future. As successful as monetary policy has
been in recent years, there is still a major agenda
for the Federal Reserve and for scholars of mone-
tary policy in assuring that the success continues.
This framework also provides an agenda for
improving policy outcomes in the future. We
need more work on how the central bank can
better communicate its policy intentions to the
market. Perhaps my biggest single surprise since
moving from academia to the Federal Reserve is
how difficult this task is. The issues are often
technically complicated; a Ph.D. in economics—
or knowledge from day-to-day immersion in
monetary policy over a span of years—really
does help in understanding the issues. Members
of the press through whom we must communi-
cate rarely have this background, and a very small
fraction of those reading press reports has this
background.
As an academic, I could talk in the abstract
about central bank transparency, openness, and
communication of policy objectives and strate-
gies; as a central banker intensely interested in
these matters, I find the task extremely difficult.
It is so very easy to say things that are misinter-
preted that sometimes it seems that the most
effective communication is to say little and let
policy actions speak for themselves. However,
in the end I believe it important that we central
bankers be more effective in communicating
what we are doing and why. Modern democra-
cies demand openness, and I think we just must
respond.
WHEN THE MARKETS AND THE
CENTRAL BANK DISAGREE
I’ve argued that in an ideal world the markets
and the central bank should arrive at the same
conclusions from the same data. What if they do
not?
Before addressing this question, let me empha-
size that I know of no models that point to the
desirability of taking action for the express pur-
pose of surprising the market. There are situations
in which randomizing policy is clearly desirable,
such as in the routing of armored trucks carrying
large amounts of currency, or the timing and
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to terrorist attacks. But I know of no such exam-
ples in the monetary policy literature.
When the markets and the central bank dis-
agree, implementing policy is more difficult. By
“disagreement” I mean a situation in which the
market’s forecast of central bank policy action
differs from what the central bank is contemplat-
ing. Disagreement may indicate that the market
really does not understand what the central bank
is doing. A clear example from U.S. experience
is the 1979-82 period. The Federal Reserve was
determined to bring the rate of inflation down
substantially, but prior experience led the market
to doubt the Fed’s resolve. Restoring credibility
once it is impaired is extremely difficult. In the
early 1980s, many market participants expected
the inflationary policies to continue, and it took
perhaps two years of determined Fed actions to
alter that presumption. In this period, the Fed
was clearly correct to falsify the market’s expec-
tations as to future monetary policy.
If the central bank is going to falsify market
expectations, it needs a clear conception of its
policy objectives and the benefits of having the
markets learn of those objectives. The central
bank needs to think through tradeoffs among
objectives and how far it is willing to go in pur-
suing its policy in opposition to market expecta-
tions. Situations differ in different countries; in
the United States, I believe that the medium-term
inflation objective is paramount and that the
Federal Reserve ought not trade off that objective
against others. However, I also believe that within
the inflation objective it is perfectly feasible for
the Fed to use correctly timed policy actions to
increase the stability of short-run output and
employment. To me, however, it is important
that the Fed not overemphasize any of the short-
run objectives because doing so may create
expectations in the market that, under certain
circumstances, will be inconsistent with the
inflation objective. When a central bank begins
to lose credibility on the inflation objective, all
sorts of other things are likely to go wrong.
More routinely, the market and the Fed may
disagree with respect to the interpretation of the
latest data release. Suppose the Fed believes that
a change in the intended rate is appropriate, but
the market is not predicting such a change? Given
the very strong inflation-fighting credibility the
Fed now enjoys, my instinct is to wait in such
circumstances. It is hard for me to believe that
the course of the economy will be affected dra-
matically if the FOMC acts at a particular meeting
or at its next meeting six weeks later. By waiting,
the markets and the Fed can digest additional
data, which may make the appropriate course of
action much clearer.
The FOMC also provides guidance to the
market about its thinking through its press release
at the end of every meeting indicating its view on
the balance of risks in terms of higher inflation
or higher unemployment. Other information in
the press release and in its meeting minutes helps
the market to understand the Fed’s policy outlook.
Ideally, the Fed should disclose as much infor-
mation as possible so that the markets and the
Fed will interpret incoming data the same way.
But when the Fed believes that quick action is
advisable, then it should act to lead the market.
Explaining the reasoning behind the action is
especially important in such circumstances. The
clearest such case since I came to the St. Louis
Fed was in the fall of 1998, a situation I’ve already
discussed.
One other observation: At times, a central
bank may want to act in a non-standard way to
send a clear message to the markets. The clearest
way to send such a message is by implementing
policy actions that are out of the ordinary. And
thatrequiresthatmostpolicyactionsbe“ordinary.”
That is, a benefit of making policy as routine and
predictable as possible is that the central bank
establishes the circumstances that enable it to
act decisively to lead the market when doing so
makes good sense.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
My theme tonight has been the accuracy
with which the market today can forecast Fed
policy actions. How is the market so successful?
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the process by which the Fed reaches its policy
decisions. That understanding in turn reflects
Fed efforts to be more transparent and more sys-
tematic. For the most part, the Fed and the market
read the flow of new information the same way.
As information arrives, the market changes the
probability it assigns to Fed action at its next
policy meeting. That is the same process I go
through myself, changing my view bit by bit as
new information arrives. At the time of an FOMC
meeting, I collate all the information, including
the expert Fed staff analysis, and settle on a ten-
tative position going into the meeting. That posi-
tion is subject to change, depending on the force
of the arguments my colleagues make during the
course of the meeting.
The goal of the policy actions is to achieve
low and stable inflation for the United States
over the long run. The Fed can do little that is
constructive about short-run fluctuations in the
rate of inflation but is responsible for the long-
run outcome. The market understands the policy
objective and therefore can judge what policy
actions are required to achieve the goal, given
the ever-changing economic environment. In the
research that Rasche and I have conducted, most
large changes in rates in the federal funds futures
market make good sense given the nature of the
new information that apparently drives these
changes.
This convergence of Fed and market opinion
about what needs to be done is a relatively new
development. Although the convergence is still
somewhat incomplete, its importance for a suc-
cessful monetary policy should not be underesti-
mated. I am continuing to work to understand
how the Fed might further improve its commu-
nication with the markets. The task is not as easy
as it might seem, given the complexity of the eco-
nomics and the short-run focus of many market
participants and press representatives. A more
thorough examination of possible steps to improve
market understanding further is a subject for
another day.
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